A Milan court put Revolut Bank UAB under judicial administration for one year over AML gaps in Italy. What Article 34 means, the key figures and next steps.
Table of contents
A Milan court has placed Revolut Bank UAB, the Lithuanian bank behind Revolut's Italian branch, under judicial administration for one year, citing serious deficiencies in its anti-money laundering controls. The measure was executed on 16 November 2026 and applies only to the Italian operations. It is preventive, the bank keeps operating, and Revolut is not under criminal investigation.
- The Milan court's prevention section ordered judicial administration under Article 34 of Italy's Anti-Mafia Code, and the Guardia di Finanza executed it on 16 November 2026.
- Prosecutors say weak controls eased transfers, concealment or diversion of capital totalling 76.5 million euros, including more than 4.6 million euros already subject to seizure orders.
- The official release does not name the bank. Reuters, which reviewed the 39-page ruling, and the Italian press identify it as Revolut Bank UAB, the Lithuanian bank behind Revolut's Italian branch.
- Under this judicial administration, the release says court-appointed administrators concentrate on the areas where failures were found, and Reuters reports a 15-point remediation plan with deadlines at 5, 30, 60 and 90 days.
- The case grew out of a 2024 inspection of the group's crypto entity, which alleged more than one million customer due diligence and record-keeping violations, and a Milan tax fraud prosecution.
What did the Milan court order against Revolut?
The Milan court's prevention section ordered one year of judicial administration over a Lithuanian bank authorised by the European Central Bank with a branch in Italy. Reuters and the Italian press identify it as Revolut Bank UAB. The Guardia di Finanza executed the order on 16 November 2026 at the request of Milan's anti-mafia prosecutors.
The official release from the prosecutor's office, published by the Guardia di Finanza, sets out the reasoning. Investigators looked at the bank's dealings with people investigated or convicted for money laundering and fraudulent transfer of assets, in some cases with a mafia aggravating factor. The prosecutors say they considered the bank "fortemente permeabile a soggetti riconducibili a contesti mafiosi o condannati per gravi delitti", meaning highly permeable to people linked to mafia circles or convicted of serious crimes.
The release says the failures were not occasional. They formed a stable management model that eased operations worth 76.5 million euros, which proper controls could have intercepted. More than 4.6 million euros of that was money already subject to precautionary asset measures, moved before it could be found.
According to Reuters, the ruling says inadequate safeguards enabled 24 people, either under investigation or already convicted, to conceal flows of 41.9 million euros between 2021 and 2026. The ruling adds that other lenders filed 265 suspicious transaction reports about them, and Revolut Bank UAB filed none. Reuters adds that Revolut is not under criminal investigation, that services to customers are not expected to be disrupted, and that the company was not immediately available for comment.
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Measure | Judicial administration for one year, Article 34 of Legislative Decree 159/2011 | Official release |
| Executed | 16 November 2026, by the Guardia di Finanza of Milan | Official release |
| Total flows eased | 76.5 million euros | Official release |
| Funds under seizure orders that were moved | More than 4.6 million euros | Official release |
| Flows tied to 24 people under investigation or convicted, 2021 to 2026 | 41.9 million euros | Ruling, as reported by Reuters |
| Reports filed by other lenders on those people | 265 | Ruling, as reported by Reuters |
| Alleged violations at the group's crypto entity | More than one million | Official release |
What is judicial administration under Article 34?
Judicial administration is a preventive measure in Italy's Anti-Mafia Code, not a penalty. A court appoints administrators to a business when there are sufficient indications that its activity may ease the work of people facing prevention measures or prosecution for listed crimes, including money laundering. The aim is to repair the business, not to punish it.
Article 34 of Legislative Decree 159/2011 sets the limits. Judicial administration lasts no more than one year. It can be extended by six months at a time, up to two years in total, if the administrator reports that the support programme is unfinished. Before it expires, the court either renews it, revokes it, or revokes it and applies the lighter judicial control of Article 34-bis. The court may also confiscate assets it has reason to believe are the fruit of illegal activity.
The release says the administrators' tasks and powers are concentrated exclusively on the areas where the failures appeared. Reuters describes two administrators with broad oversight and inspection powers, which could widen if the bank does not fully cooperate or further problems emerge. It lists the deadlines below.
| Deadline | What is due | Who |
|---|---|---|
| 5 days | Appoint an internal liaison officer | The bank |
| 30 days | Preliminary report | The administrators |
| 60 days | Action plan addressing the compliance failures | The bank |
| 90 days | Full assessment of AML controls | The administrators |
| One year | Court decides whether to renew, revoke or step down to judicial control (Article 34) | The court |
Milan has used the tool on a bank before. In October 2024 the same court section placed a Milan investment bank under judicial administration over state-guaranteed loans to companies linked to 'ndrangheta, according to a Guardia di Finanza release. This case involves a mass-market bank: prosecutors say the Revolut group has more than five million customers in Italy, Reuters reports.
How did the investigation start?
The case grew out of two earlier Guardia di Finanza files, the release says. One was an anti-money laundering inspection of a virtual asset service provider in the same banking group. The other was a tax fraud prosecution in Milan, in which accounts at the bank turned out to have been used to commit tax crimes.
The inspection produced the largest number in the case. Investigators alleged more than one million violations of customer due diligence and data retention duties, plus failures to report suspicious transactions, 60 of them according to Reuters. Reuters identifies the entity as Revolut Digital Assets Europe and says the inspection report was completed in December 2024 and sent to Italy's Economy Ministry, which imposes administrative penalties. The ministry has not formally opened penalty proceedings because Revolut's deadline to file objections runs until 2027, two sources told Reuters.
Investigators then matched the bank's customers against court records. Il Giorno reports that the decree describes how accounts were opened in the app with a phone number, an identity document and a selfie. The judges observe, Il Giorno reports, that automated systems did not gather and connect decisive information about customers or spot anomalous operations in time. Il Giorno adds that the bank is not accused of intentional participation in the crimes. The judges describe negligent facilitation.
What does the case mean for your AML obligations?
The case rests on ordinary duties, applied to a digital bank at scale: customer due diligence, record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting under Italy's AML decree. The new element is the consequence. Failures usually punished with administrative fines led here to court-appointed administrators, through a law written for mafia infiltration.
| Duty | Legal basis or source | How it features in the case |
|---|---|---|
| Customer due diligence | Article 17, Legislative Decree 231/2007 | Accounts used by people with convictions, open investigations or prevention measures |
| Suspicious transaction reporting | Article 35 | 265 reports from other lenders, none from the bank according to Reuters |
| Record keeping | Article 31 | More than one million due diligence and retention violations alleged at the crypto entity |
| Branches of foreign banks | Article 3 | Italian branches of banks based in another member state are obliged entities |
| Automated controls | Official release | Stricter duty to ensure relevant data and reliable alerts |
Start with customer due diligence. Article 17 of Legislative Decree 231/2007 requires obliged entities to verify the customer and the beneficial owner when a relationship starts. Onboarding by document and selfie, as Il Giorno describes it, identifies a person without telling the bank who that person is. The release says people with convictions, open investigations or prevention measures against them gained access to the financial system.
Suspicious transaction reporting is the sharpest comparison. Under Article 35, a suspicious transaction report goes to Italy's Financial Intelligence Unit without delay, before the operation is carried out. Other lenders filed 265 reports on the customers examined, according to the ruling as reported by Reuters. A regulator or prosecutor can benchmark one firm's reporting against its peers on the same customers, and a gap that wide invites questions.
Record keeping under Article 31 matters because the records must allow the authorities to reconstruct what happened. The release says more than 4.6 million euros subject to precautionary asset measures was moved. That suggests name screening should cover judicial measures, where such information is available to the firm, as well as sanctions and politically exposed persons.
Automation raises the bar. The release says that for an international digital bank, the use of automated systems makes the duty stricter to ensure they acquire relevant information, generate reliable alerts, allow enhanced checks and intercept anomalous patterns. Article 3 of the same decree lists the Italian branches of banks based in another member state among obliged entities, so a licence elsewhere does not move the standard. Recent actions against Coinbase in Ireland and Modulr in the Netherlands made the same point about group structures.
What is still uncertain about the Revolut case?
Several facts are not public. The court's decree has not been published, the official release names no bank, and the two headline figures do not match. Revolut's own account is missing from the reports reviewed. Judicial administration is also preventive and provisional: nothing in it is a finding of criminal liability.
The numbers need care. The release cites 76.5 million euros across a wide group of people. Reuters, citing the ruling, reports 41.9 million euros for 24 people and ties all 265 peer reports to them. Il Giorno reports 265 as an overall total, including 112 on 24 customers of the crypto entity and 107 on 22 people in a separate proceeding, and puts almost 42 million euros against the 22. It also counts two reports from the Revolut group, sent after investigators intervened, where Reuters counts none from the bank. No public document reconciles these accounts.
The legal basis invites argument. Article 34 was written for businesses that ease the activity of people facing prevention measures or prosecution. It has been used on fashion and logistics companies, Reuters notes, and now on a bank whose conduct prosecutors call negligent. Whether weak controls alone meet the statutory test is a question the bank can contest.
The supervisory picture is crowded. A Lithuanian licence, European Central Bank authorisation, Italian AML rules and now the Milan court's prevention section all touch the same branch. The release does not say what role the Bank of Italy or the Lithuanian supervisor played. The outcome of the judicial administration is open too. The administrative penalty file on the crypto entity is still pending.
How should compliance teams respond?
Treat this judicial administration as a test any digital onboarding model may face: can your controls tell you who a customer is, beyond confirming a face matches a document? Check adverse judicial information at onboarding, compare your reporting with what peers would file, and prove that automated alerts work.
First, widen screening. Sanctions and PEP lists do not include people under investigation, convicted of laundering or subject to seizure orders. Add adverse media and court-record sources where the law allows, and rerun them through the relationship, not only at onboarding. Second, measure reporting. Take a sample of customers later charged or sanctioned and ask how many your systems flagged first. Third, test the automation. Document what data each alert model receives, how often it fires and who reviews it.
Identity proofing does not replace screening and monitoring, and stronger checks do not require bigger archives of identity documents. Zyphe verifies identity with an NFC chip read and two-step liveness, then encrypts documents and biometrics into the user's own vault, so the business receives verification results and proofs with an exportable audit trail and there is no central store of customer PII. See our AML software and perpetual KYC software, or book a demo.
The bottom line
Italy has taken judicial administration, a tool built for mafia infiltration, and applied it to a digital bank's compliance function. The order is preventive and can be contested, and key facts are still unpublished. Teams running KYC and AML should expect their reporting to be compared with their peers', and their automated controls to be judged on results.
Cited sources
- Guardia di Finanza and Milan Public Prosecutor's Office, official release on the judicial administration measure, 16 November 2026
- Legislative Decree 159/2011 (Anti-Mafia Code), Article 34, judicial administration (Normattiva)
- Legislative Decree 159/2011, Article 34-bis, judicial control of businesses (Normattiva)
- Legislative Decree 231/2007, Article 3, obliged entities including branches of foreign banks (Normattiva)
- Legislative Decree 231/2007, Article 17, customer due diligence (Normattiva)
- Legislative Decree 231/2007, Article 31, record-keeping duties (Normattiva)
- Legislative Decree 231/2007, Article 35, suspicious transaction reporting (Normattiva)
- Guardia di Finanza release on the October 2024 judicial administration of a Milan investment bank
- Reuters, Italian court places Revolut unit under supervision over money laundering, 16 November 2026
- Il Giorno, report on the decree and its figures, 16 November 2026
Michelangelo Frigo (Co-Founder at Zyphe) Michelangelo Frigo is a privacy and identity infrastructure expert and co-founder of Zyphe.