The Coinone data breach began at MetaM, its outsourced support desk: resident numbers, bank accounts and passwords customers gave agents. What KYC teams do now.
Table of contents
The Coinone data breach did not start at the exchange: an attacker entered the servers of MetaM, the firm running its customer support, on 12 November 2026. Coinone says chat and phone records may have exposed resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and passwords that customers gave agents. Coinone says its trading and wallet systems show no sign of intrusion.
- Coinone says an attacker accessed MetaM's servers at about 04:00 KST on 12 November and viewed or took stored support records. MetaM told Coinone at about 09:20 the same day.
- The possibly exposed items are 11 fields customers left in chats or calls, including resident registration numbers, ID issue dates, home addresses, wallet addresses and passwords.
- Coinone says customers who never contacted support are not affected. Coinone has not published a count of affected customers.
- Coinone reported the incident to KISA, the Personal Information Protection Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service, and moved outsourced support to email only.
- Under Korea's Personal Information Protection Act, the controller must supervise its processor, and the processor counts as the controller's employee for damages caused by processing that breaks the Act.
What happened in the Coinone data breach?
An outside attacker got into MetaM, the contractor that handles Coinone's chat and phone support, and viewed or took the support records stored there. Coinone's notice of 15 November 2026 places the intrusion at about 04:00 KST on 12 November. MetaM reported it to Coinone at about 09:20 that morning.
The notice says customers with no support history are "이번 정보유출과는 무관함", meaning unrelated to this leak. Coinone says the breach did not reach its own platform: member accounts, trading systems and crypto wallet systems run separately from the contractor's servers. It has found no sign that they were entered directly. The exact time and method of the intrusion are still under investigation with MetaM and outside specialists, and Coinone says it will update customers as it learns more.
MetaM was not serving Coinone alone. ZDNet Korea reported that MetaM's own website notice of 14 November traced the incident to a service outage it noticed at 06:03 on 12 November. The same report says MetaM filed an intrusion report with KISA at 03:44 on 13 November, and that the marketplace Bungaejangter and the coffee chain Mega MGC Coffee also told customers their data had leaked.
| Time (KST) | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 12 Nov, about 04:00 | Attacker accesses MetaM servers holding support records | Coinone notice |
| 12 Nov, 06:03 | MetaM notices a support service outage that leads it to the intrusion | MetaM notice, as reported by ZDNet Korea |
| 12 Nov, about 09:20 | MetaM informs Coinone | Coinone notice |
| 13 Nov, 03:44 | MetaM reports the intrusion to KISA | ZDNet Korea |
| 15 Nov | Coinone publishes its breach notice to customers | Coinone notice |
The Coinone timings come from the exchange's own notice. The MetaM timings come from MetaM's website notice as reported by ZDNet Korea, which we could not retrieve directly.
What data did the Coinone data breach expose?
The exposed data is whatever customers typed or said to support agents: up to 11 fields, several of them the raw material of KYC. Coinone lists phone number, name, email, date of birth, bank account number, password, resident registration number, ID card issue date, home address, crypto wallet address and transaction ID (TXID).
Coinone stresses that the list is the full set of fields the Coinone data breach could have exposed, not what every customer lost. Each support conversation held different details, so exposure varies by person. Coinone says it is preparing a lookup service so customers can check which of their own fields were affected.
| Field | Why it matters after a leak |
|---|---|
| Resident registration number | Korea's national identifier, used in identity checks and account opening |
| ID card issue date | Often asked alongside the resident number to confirm an ID card is current |
| Bank account number | Helps a fraudster pass knowledge checks when posing as the customer |
| Password | Directly reusable on other sites where the customer used the same one |
| Wallet address and TXID | Link a named person to on-chain holdings and transfers |
| Name, phone, email, home address | Enough to make a convincing phishing call that cites a real support case |
Coinone argues the leaked data alone cannot be used to log in. Every login requires a second factor, either an OTP or KakaoTalk verification on the customer's own phone, and logins from unofficial apps are blocked. It still told anyone who shared a password with an agent to change it on Coinone and on every other site using it.
What does Korean law require when a processor is breached?
Korea's Personal Information Protection Act keeps the liability with Coinone as the controller, even though the intrusion happened at MetaM. Article 26 governs entrusted processing. In the Korea Legislation Research Institute's English translation, Article 26(7) says "the person entrusted shall be deemed an employee of the personal information controller" for damages arising from processing that breaks the Act.
Article 26(4) requires the controller to educate the processor and supervise how it handles personal data, including by inspecting its processing. Article 64-2(1)5 lets the Protection Commission impose a penalty surcharge of up to 3% of total sales where a controller neglects that supervision and the processor then breaks the law. That is the provision most directly at issue in Coinone's vendor oversight.
Two other provisions matter here. Article 24-2 restricts processing of resident registration numbers to cases a law requires or permits, and requires them to be stored encrypted. Article 34 requires the controller to notify affected people "without delay" and report to the Commission or a designated body. Coinone published its customer notice on 15 November, three days after MetaM told it of the intrusion. Coinone's notice also sets out customers' damages rights under Articles 39 and 39-2: up to five times the loss for an intentional or negligent leak, or statutory damages of up to three million won without proving the loss.
What does this mean for your obligations?
The Coinone data breach changes how firms should evidence vendor oversight, not just how they notify. Any regulated firm that outsources support, wherever it operates, should treat the support desk as a store of customer due diligence data and govern it under the same duties.
Processor contracts and supervision are the first duty. Under GDPR Article 28, a controller may use only processors that give sufficient guarantees of appropriate security. Article 28(3)(h) gives the controller audit and inspection rights; Korea's Article 26(4) makes supervision, including inspection, a duty. A signed contract is not evidence of supervision; an inspection record of what the support platform stores, for how long and who can query it is.
Breach notification is the second. GDPR Article 33 sets a 72-hour clock for reporting to the authority from when the controller becomes aware. Coinone learned of the incident from MetaM. Contracts should fix how fast a processor must tell the controller, because the controller's clock depends on it.
Customer due diligence records are the third. Exchanges and banks collect identity data under AML rules and must keep those records. That duty covers the KYC file, not copies of resident numbers sitting in chat transcripts. Support tooling should mask or block identifiers in free text, and agents should never request or accept passwords.
Ongoing monitoring is the fourth. Customers whose identifiers leaked are now at higher risk of account takeover and impersonation. Firms should flag their accounts for closer review of logins, withdrawal address changes and new device enrolments, and treat a call citing a past support case as a possible social engineering attempt. Fraud that results may require a suspicious transaction report under local AML law.
What is still uncertain or at risk?
The biggest unknown is scale: Coinone has not said how many customers had support records on MetaM's servers. It also does not yet know the exact time and method of entry. Until both are known, the affected population and the fields lost per person remain estimates.
The second open question is MetaM's wider client base, which could make the Coinone data breach one part of a larger incident. Boan News reported that MetaM has about 150 client companies, including hospitals. Only three clients have been named in reporting so far, so more notifications may follow.
Third, liability for the Coinone data breach is likely to be argued between controller and processor. Article 26(7) points damages claims at Coinone, which can then seek recovery from MetaM under their contract. Whether the Protection Commission finds that Coinone neglected supervision will decide whether a sales-based surcharge applies.
Fourth, the password exposure is a process failure, not only a security one. Coinone's notice confirms customers gave passwords to agents in chats and calls. Even if no account was entered, a workflow that let agents receive secrets will draw scrutiny under Article 29, the Act's duty of safeguards. Resident numbers and real support histories are what a convincing impersonation call needs, so that risk outlasts any password reset.
How does it compare with earlier support channel breaches?
The Coinone data breach fits a pattern: attackers go after the people and contractors who can see KYC data, not the core platform. Coinbase's 2025 incident and the Uber breach of October 2026, disclosed this month, both started with staff or vendor access rather than an exploit of the main system.
| Incident | Entry point | Identity data affected | Disclosed scale or cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coinone, November 2026 | Outsourced support contractor's servers | Resident numbers, ID issue dates, bank accounts, passwords | Not disclosed |
| Uber, October 2026 | Stolen credentials of an AI service provider | Driving licence images and extracted text | 149,346 people (Oregon filing) |
| Coinbase, May 2025 | Paid-off support contractors and employees outside the US | Government ID images, masked SSNs, masked bank accounts | 180 to 400 million dollars of estimated costs |
| Korea, 16 financial firms, October 2026 | Systems used by outside staff, contractors and employees | Names, contact details, resident numbers | About 100,000 records |
Coinbase's figures are from its Form 8-K filed with the SEC, which says the attacker paid support personnel to collect data from internal systems. The Uber and Korea rows come from our coverage of the Uber data breach and the Korea financial data breach.
The common thread is that support and service roles need some customer data to do their jobs. Each copy of an identifier sitting in a support system, a vendor bucket or a shared drive becomes another place it can leak. Our analysis of why your KYC vendor is your biggest data breach risk covers the same point.
How should compliance teams respond?
Start by finding every place outside the KYC system where identity data lands, starting with support. Pull a sample of chat and call records and check whether they contain national identifiers, ID numbers, bank details or passwords. If they do, the support desk is a KYC data store and needs KYC-grade controls.
Then turn the four duties above into your next vendor review: masking of identifiers in support tools, a notification deadline measured in hours in every processor contract, a written inspection record, and closer monitoring of affected accounts. The Coinone data breach makes them urgent. Back them with a customer playbook that tells people what a genuine support call will never ask for.
Zyphe was built so that the business, and the vendors it relies on, never need to hold a reusable copy of a customer's identity documents. Verified data is encrypted into the user's own vault and split across thousands of independent nodes, and the business receives verification results and proofs rather than copies. See how our PII storage and our KYC software work, or book a demo.
The bottom line
The Coinone data breach shows that a firm's KYC exposure is not limited to its KYC system. Customers will tell a support agent their national identifier, bank account and even password if asked or allowed to. Wherever that conversation is stored becomes a copy of the identity file, often held by a contractor. Under Korean law, as under GDPR, the controller remains answerable for it. The lesson for KYC and AML teams is to reduce how many copies of identity data exist, and to supervise every vendor that still holds one.
Cited sources
- Coinone, notice on the personal information leak, 15 November 2026 (Korean)
- Personal Information Protection Act, Articles 24-2, 26, 29, 34, 39, 39-2 and 64-2, KLRI English translation
- Coinbase Global, Form 8-K, Item 1.05 cybersecurity incident, May 2025
- GDPR Article 28, processor obligations
- GDPR Article 33, notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority
- ZDNet Korea, report on the MetaM server breach and affected clients, 17 November 2026 (Korean)
- Boan News, report on MetaM's client base, November 2026 (Korean)
Michelangelo Frigo (Co-Founder at Zyphe) Michelangelo Frigo is a privacy and identity infrastructure expert and co-founder of Zyphe.