On 5 November 2026 OFAC added 4 people and 41 firms to its Prince Group sanctions, aimed at nominees, a spouse and BVI shelf firms. What KYB teams must change.
Table of contents
On 5 November 2026 OFAC widened its Prince Group sanctions to 4 more individuals and 41 more entities, aimed at the people and companies that kept the network running after earlier designations. They include a wife holding property, a co-director, a personal assistant and 14 Hong Kong and British Virgin Islands companies. OFAC also designated one Malaysian scam operator.
- OFAC designated 45 targets under E.O. 13581 for supporting the Prince Group Transnational Criminal Organization, plus Malaysian national Chui Kok Wa under the cyber sanctions order E.O. 13694.
- Treasury says the new targets helped the network after the October 2025 and June 2026 rounds by "managing offshore corporate structures, concealing beneficial ownership".
- One executive, Chen Bo, transferred his Tokyo mansion to his wife after October 2025. A Cambodian associate, Visal Pang, controls 11 companies, several of which he co-directs with Chen Bo.
- Five of the newly listed Hong Kong companies share one office address, and five BVI companies were incorporated within a week of each other in November 2018.
- Several entity names in the press release differ from the SDN List entries, so screening must run against the list, not the announcement.
What did OFAC announce on 5 November 2026?
OFAC's third round of Prince Group sanctions blocks 4 individuals and 41 entities that Treasury says serviced the network's leaders after they were first designated. It is a follow-up aimed at evasion, not new leadership. A separate designation names Chui Kok Wa, who Treasury says ran Madagascar-based scammers that took over 400,000 dollars from Americans.
The Treasury press release says the new targets helped sustain the network "by managing offshore corporate structures, concealing beneficial ownership" and by providing administrative and financial services to senior executives. Individuals were also involved in "the transfer of property and owning of companies" with or for leaders who were already designated.
The Prince Group action groups into four clusters, each tied to a person already on the SDN List or designated the same day. The last row is the separate Chui Kok Wa designation.
| Cluster | Newly listed | What Treasury says they did | Where based or registered |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qiu Yong | Qiu, his assistant Zhao Mengyao, 14 companies | Beneficial owner of BVI holding firms over Hong Kong money lenders and wine businesses | BVI, Hong Kong |
| Chen Bo (listed June 2026) | His wife He Yujing, associate Visal Pang, 23 companies | Wife received his Tokyo mansion after October 2025; associate controls 11 companies, several co-directed with Chen Bo | Cambodia |
| Dai An (listed June 2026) | 3 companies | Majority owner or director | Singapore, Mauritius, Malaysia |
| Thet Li (listed October 2025) | 1 company | 100 percent owner | Singapore |
| Chui Kok Wa | 1 individual | Ran a Madagascar-based scam network | Malaysian national, based in Madagascar |
The cluster counts come from the SDN List update for 5 November 2026. Chen Bo's 23 companies are 11 he controls, 11 controlled by Visal Pang and 1 owned by He Yujing.
How does this wave differ from the earlier Prince Group sanctions?
The earlier Prince Group sanctions targeted the core: the chairman, the conglomerate and its shells. This wave targets what grew back around designated people. Treasury's examples are a spouse who received property, a co-director and an assistant serving as company secretary. It also names companies tied to Chen Bo and Dai An, both listed in June.
The Prince Group sanctions have shrunk in scale while their focus has narrowed. The October 2025 action imposed sanctions on 146 targets, including 117 affiliated businesses that Treasury said were mostly offshore shells. The June 2026 action added 9 individuals and 26 entities. Our June coverage explains that round and the parallel FinCEN move on H-Pay.
| Date | Targets | Main focus | Parallel action |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 October 2025 | 146 | Chen Zhi, Prince Holding Group, 117 affiliated businesses | UK sanctions, US indictment, FinCEN Huione rule |
| 23 June 2026 | 35 | Leadership, scam compound investors, front companies | FinCEN proposal to add H-Pay |
| 5 November 2026 | 45 plus 1 | Nominees, family, co-directors, holding companies | With FBI, DOJ Scam Center Strike Force and US Attorney (Alaska); BVI FIA and UK FCDO assisted |
The control point explains part of this wave. Under OFAC FAQ 398, the 50 percent rule "speaks only to ownership and not to control." A company that Chen Bo co-directs, but owns less than half of, is not blocked automatically. Chen Bo has been listed since June, yet OFAC only now named 11 Cambodian companies Treasury says he still controls. Treasury gives no ownership percentages, so naming them removes any doubt. FAQ 398 warns that such controlled entities "may become the subject of future designations".
What patterns in the SDN entries should KYB teams notice?
The SDN entries show the evasion pattern in registry data that a KYB check can see. Five Hong Kong companies linked to Qiu Yong list the same office in Kwun Tong. Three of his BVI holding companies use the same Road Town registered address. Five of his BVI companies were incorporated within a week in November 2018.
The listing data is specific. Direct Astute, Solar Scape and Sino Sagacious were all established on 15 November 2018, and Glad Glory and Victory Flora on 22 November 2018, according to the SDN List update. Treasury calls four of the BVI companies "shelf companies". Qiu Yong is listed with Cambodian, Turkish and Saint Lucian nationalities, and He Yujing with Chinese and Vanuatu passports.
None of these signals is unlawful on its own. A shared registered address is normal for BVI companies, and dual nationality is common. The value is in combination: a cluster of same-week incorporations, one shared office, and a beneficial owner holding several passports is a pattern worth an enhanced due diligence review, whoever the owner turns out to be.
The same pattern links two clusters in Cambodia. He Yujing's company, Super Light Speed Kh Technology, lists the same Chamkar Mon address in Phnom Penh as four of Visal Pang's companies, including the CFU construction group and the two U-Life companies. A shared address puts the wife and the co-director side by side in registry data.
Some links were visible before this round. Treasury says Qiu Yong and Zhao Mengyao are shareholders of Mighty Divine Trust Hong Kong, a company OFAC designated in October 2025. A shareholder register check against already-listed companies could have surfaced both names about a year before this round.
The naming gap matters too. The press release refers to "Solar Scape Financial Limited" and "Cambodia First Unite Construction Group (CFU Group) Co., Ltd.", while the SDN List reads SOLAR SCAPE FINANCE LIMITED and CAMBODIA FIRST UNITE CONSTRUCTION GROUP CO., LTD. The release also calls He Yujing a Cambodian national, while her SDN entry lists Chinese and Vanuatu nationality. A screening rule built from the announcement could miss the listed record.
What do the Prince Group sanctions mean for your obligations?
For US persons, the Prince Group sanctions create immediate blocking and reporting duties. They also test whether beneficial ownership records can show a link to a designated person through a spouse or co-director. The duties sit in OFAC's regulations, FinCEN's customer due diligence rule and SAR filing.
Sanctions screening comes first. All property and interests in property of the 46 new targets that are in the United States or held by US persons is blocked, and so is any entity owned 50 percent or more, in aggregate, by blocked persons. FAQ 401 confirms that indirect ownership through chains counts. Re-screen customers, counterparties and payment parties against the updated list, and run a sanctions screening refresh on dormant files as well as active ones.
Reporting runs on a fixed clock. Under 31 CFR 501.603, blocked property must be reported to OFAC within 10 business days. Rejected transactions have the same deadline under section 501.604. OFAC can impose civil penalties on a strict liability basis, the press release notes.
Customer due diligence changes in substance. The current FinCEN rule at 31 CFR 1010.230 asks for each individual owning 25 percent or more and one individual with significant control. A spouse who now holds an asset, or a co-director, can fill those fields with clean names. Recording the ultimate beneficial owner is not enough; teams should ask how and when ownership last changed.
Suspicious activity reporting completes the picture. A customer that restructured, transferred assets to relatives or swapped directors soon after a related designation may justify a suspicious activity report, even if no listed name appears. For banks, the duty sits in 31 CFR 1020.320.
Firms outside the United States screen against their own regimes. EU and UK lists do not move in step with OFAC, as the earlier UK listing of Visal Pang shows, so a group that operates in several markets should screen each customer against every list that applies to it.
What is still uncertain, and where are the risks?
The biggest open question is what the Prince Group sanctions do not reach. OFAC named 41 entities, but the 50 percent rule only blocks companies that listed people own 50 percent or more of, directly or indirectly. Any company the network controls through other nominees, and which OFAC has not named, still looks clean on a list check.
Treasury has not said how much property the new targets hold, how much was moved, or what the Tokyo mansion is worth. It also gives no total for the network's proceeds beyond "billions of dollars". Firms cannot size their exposure from the announcement alone.
Timing is a risk for anyone relying on registry data. Chen Bo transferred the mansion after the October 2025 action, while his own designation came in June 2026. Ownership records collected at onboarding may describe a structure that changed in the gap. Periodic review that refreshes ownership only every few years would miss that move.
There is also a cross-border split. Treasury says the United Kingdom designated Visal Pang on 26 March 2026, more than seven months before OFAC did.
The listing data is also thin in places. Five of the BVI entries, including Sun Speed Holdings and Win Applause, give no address beyond the territory, so a match rests mainly on the company number and incorporation date.
Why does the Chui Kok Wa designation matter?
The Chui Kok Wa designation shows OFAC using cyber sanctions against an individual scam operator, not only conglomerates. Treasury says his network, based in Madagascar, defrauded Americans of over 400,000 dollars, including digital assets. That is a small figure next to the Prince Group's scale.
The legal basis is different. Chui is listed under E.O. 13694 with the CYBER4 tag, not the TCO tag used for the Prince Group targets. Screening rules filtered by programme code would treat him separately. For crypto businesses, the lesson matches our September coverage of Xinbi Guarantee: scam-linked designations now reach operators and marketplaces, not only leaders.
How should compliance teams respond?
Teams should re-screen against the 5 November SDN update for the Prince Group sanctions, then look past names to structure. The useful work is checking which customers share addresses, incorporation dates or officers with the listed companies, and whether ownership changed after October 2025.
Concrete steps: load the SDN entries rather than the press release; search corporate customers for the Mai Gar Industrial Building address in Kwun Tong and the Boeng Keng Kang Muoy address in Chamkar Mon, plus the Cambodian tax IDs and the registration numbers in the listing; flag Hong Kong or BVI entities whose ownership or directors changed after 14 October 2025; and record why each match was cleared or escalated. Our sanctions screening guide covers match handling in more depth.
Zyphe's KYB software resolves beneficial ownership recursively across 240+ corporate registries, at a 25 percent default threshold that can be set per risk tier, and keeps an exportable audit trail of each check. To see how it handles layered structures like these, book a demo.
The bottom line
This round of Prince Group sanctions shows how a sanctioned network adapts: property moves to family, directors change, and holding companies stay one step away from a listed name. Screening against a list catches the people OFAC has named. Catching the structures around them takes ownership history, shared-attribute checks and periodic refresh, which is where most KYB programmes are thinnest.
Cited sources
- US Treasury press release sb0683, Treasury Targets Global Scam Networks and the Corporate Infrastructure That Enables Them, 5 November 2026
- OFAC recent actions, SDN List update of 5 November 2026
- US Treasury press release sb0538, June 2026 Prince Group designations
- US Treasury press release sb0278, October 2025 Prince Group designations
- OFAC FAQ 398, control and the 50 percent rule
- OFAC FAQ 401, indirect ownership under the 50 percent rule
- 31 CFR 501.603, reports of blocked property
- 31 CFR 1010.230, beneficial ownership requirements for legal entity customers
- 31 CFR 1020.320, suspicious activity reports by banks
Michelangelo Frigo (Co-Founder at Zyphe) Michelangelo Frigo is a privacy and identity infrastructure expert and co-founder of Zyphe.